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Abstract
In this paper, we study the impact of an incremental level
of skill in the forgeries against signature verification sys-
tems. Experiments are carried out using both off-line sys-
tems, involving the discrimination of signatures written on
a piece of paper, and on-line systems, in which dynamic in-
formation of the signing process (such as velocity and ac-
celeration) is also available. We use for our experiments the
BiosecurID database, which contains both on-line and off-
line versions of signatures, acquired in four sessions across
a 4 month time span with incremental level of skill in the
forgeries for different sessions. We compare several scenar-
ios with different size and variability of the enrolment set,
showing that the problem of skilled forgeries can be allevi-
ated as we consider more signatures for enrolment.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, due to the expansion of the networked soci-
ety, an automatic correct assessment of identity is a crucial
point. This has resulted in the establishment of a new re-
search and technology area known as biometrics [1], which
refers to automatic recognition of an individual based on
behavioral and/or anatomical characteristics (e.g., finger-
prints, face, iris, voice, signature, etc.).
The handwritten signature is one of the most widely used
individual authentication methods due to its acceptance in
government, legal and commercial transactions [2]. There
are two main signature recognition approaches [3, 4]: off-
line and on-line. Off-line methods consider only the sig-
nature image, so only static information is available for the
recognition task. On-line systems use pen tablets or digi-
tizers which capture dynamic information such as velocity
and acceleration of the signing process, providing a richer
source of information and more reliability [3].
Despite the evident advantages of biometric systems,
they are not free from external attacks which can decrease
their level of security. Thus, it is of utmost importance
to analyze the vulnerabilities of biometric systems, in or-
der to find their limitations and to develop useful counter-
measures for foreseeable attacks [5]. Like other biometric
systems, signature verification systems are exposed to forg-
eries, which can be easily performed by direct observation
and learning of the signature by the forger. Signature ver-
ification systems are usually evaluated by analyzing their
ability to accept genuine signatures and to reject forgeries.
In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of signature
verification systems to forgeries created with an increas-
ing level of skill. For this purpose, we use the BiosecurID
database [6], which contains both on-line and off-line ver-
sions of signatures acquired in several sessions with an in-
cremental level of skill in the forgeries. For the verification
experiments, three machine experts exploiting information
at different levels have been used (one on-line [7] and two
off-line [8, 9]). Several enrolment strategies with different
size and variability of the enrolment set are studied.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The prob-
lem of forgeries with different level of skill is briefly ad-
dressed in Section 2. The three machine experts used are
described in Section 3. The experimental framework used,
including the database and protocol, is described in Sec-
tion 4. The results obtained are presented in Section 5, and
conclusions are finally drawn in Section 6.
2. Types of forgeries in signature recognition
When considering forgeries, five categories can be de-
fined depending on the level of attack [10].
• Random forgeries, simulated by using signatures
from other users as input, so no knowledge about the
signature being attacked is exploited. This case does
not represent intentional forgeries, but accidental ac-
cesses by impostors without information to help them
in their attack to the system.
Feature
Extraction
Input
Signature
MACHINE EXPERT
Enrolled
Models
Identity claim
Matching
Score
Normalization
DECISION
THRESHOLD
Accepted or
Rejected
Pre-
Processing
CLAIMED USER
Figure 1. System model for person authentication based on handwritten signature.
• Blind forgeries, which are signature samples gener-
ated by intentional impostors that have access to a de-
scriptive or textual knowledge of the original signa-
tures (e.g. the name of the person).
• Static forgeries (low-force in [10]), where the forger
has access to a visual static image of the signature.
There are two ways to generate the forgeries. In the
first one, the forger can use a blueprint to copy the sig-
nature, leading to static blueprint forgeries. In the sec-
ond one, the forger can train to imitate the signature,
with or without a blueprint, for a limited or unlimited
amount of time. The forger then generate the imitated
signature, without the help of the blueprint, leading to
static trained forgeries.
• Dynamic forgeries (brute-force in [10]), where the
forger has access to a visual static image and to the
whole writing process (i.e. the dynamics). The dy-
namics can be obtained in the presence of the original
writer, or through a video-recording, or also through
the obtention of the on-line version of the signature.
In a similar way as the previous category, the forger
can then generate two types of forgeries. Dynamic
blueprint forgeries are generated by projecting on
the acquisition area a real-time pointer that the forger
needs to follow. Dynamic trained forgeries are pro-
duced after a training period where the forger can use
dedicated tools to analyze and train to reproduce the
genuine signature.
• Regained forgeries, where the forger has only access
to the static image of the signature and makes use of
a dedicated software to regain its dynamics, which are
later analyzed and used to create dynamic forgeries.
3. Signature verification systems
This section describes the basics of the three machine
experts used in this paper. They exploit information at two
different levels. The on-line signature system is based on
local image analysis and left-to-right Hidden Markov Mod-
els [7]. For off-line analysis, we use an approach based
on global analysis of the image [9] and a second approach
based on local analysis [8]. In Figure 1, the overall system
model of a signature machine expert is depicted.
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Figure 2. Feature extraction stage performed
in the global off-line system.
3.1. On-line system based on HMM
The on-line signature verification system [7] is based
on the recognition algorithm from ATVS presented at the
First International Signature Verification Competition (SVC
2004)1. Coordinate trajectories and the pressure signal are
considered. Signature trajectories are first preprocessed by
subtracting the center of mass followed by a rotation align-
ment based on the average path tangent angle. An extended
set of 14 discrete-time functions are then derived from the
preprocessed trajectories. Given an enrolment set of K sig-
natures of a client, a left-to-right Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) is estimated and used for characterizing the client
identity (2 states, 32 Gaussian mixtures per state). This
HMM is used to compute the similarity matching score be-
tween a given test signature and a claimed identity.
3.2. Global off-line system
This system is based on global image analysis and a min-
imum distance classifier [9]. In this matcher, slant direc-
tions of the signature strokes and those of the envelopes of
the dilated signature images are extracted with mathemat-
ical morphology operators. For slant direction extraction,
the preprocessed signature image is eroded with 32 struc-
turing elements as those shown in Figure 2 (left). A slant
direction feature sub-vector of 32 components is then gen-
erated, where each component is computed as the signature
1www.cs.ust.hk/svc2004
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Figure 4. Signature examples from the BiosecurID Database. The left sample is a genuine signature
and the remaining ones are forgeries with incremental level of skill. In each case, plots below each
signature correspond to the on-line information stored in the database.
Contour hinge
Figure 3. Graphical example of the contour
curvature (local off-line system).
pixel count in each eroded image. For envelope direction
extraction, the preprocessed signature image is successively
dilated 5 times with the 6 structuring elements shown in
Figure 2 (right). An envelope direction feature sub-vector
of 5× 6 components is then generated, where each compo-
nent is computed as the signature pixel count in the differ-
ence image between successive dilations. The preprocessed
signature is parameterized by concatenating the slant and
envelope feature sub-vectors. Each client (enrolee) of the
system is modeled by the mean and standard deviation vec-
tors of an enrolment set of K parameterized signatures. To
compute the similarity score between a claimed model and a
parameterized test signature, the inverse of the Mahalanobis
distance is used.
3.3. Local off-line system
This matcher uses contour level features [8]. Curvature
of the contour is computed as follows. We consider two
contour fragments attached at a common end pixel and com-
pute the joint probability distribution of the orientations φ1
and φ2 of the two sides, see Figure 3. A joint density func-
tion (PDF) is obtained, which quantifies the chance of find-
ing two “hinged” contour fragments with angles φ1 and φ2,
respectively. Each client of the system (enrolee) is repre-
sented by a PDF that is computed using an enrolment set of
K signatures. To compute the similarity between a claimed
identity and a given signature, the χ2 distance is used.
4 Database and experimental protocol
4.1 Database
We have used for our experiments a sub-corpus of the
BiosecurID multimodal database [6], containing signatures
from 133 users acquired in 4 different sessions distributed
in a 4 months time span. Each user has 4 genuine signatures
and 3 forgery signatures per session (from 3 different forg-
ers, the same for the 4 sessions). The resulting sub-corpus
has 133× 4× (4 + 3) = 3, 724 signatures.
An incremental level of skill in the forgeries was consid-
ered during the acquisition of each session, resulting in four
different scenarios (see Figure 4): Skill level 1 in session
1, where the forger only sees the signature image once (off-
line information) and tries to imitate it; Skill level 2 in ses-
sion 2, where the forger sees the signature image once (off-
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Figure 5. Enrolment strategies considered.
line information), trains for a minute in a piece of paper,
and then imitates the signature; Skill level 3 in session 3,
where the forger sees the dynamic signature process 3 times
using a dedicated software (on-line information), trains for
a minute in a piece of paper, and then imitates the signa-
ture; and Skill level 4 in session 4, where the forger sees the
dynamic signature (on-line information) as many times as
he/she requests, trains for a minute in a piece of paper and
then imitates the signature. Following the nomenclature of
Section 2, forgeries of sessions 1 and 2 are static forgeries,
and those of sessions 3 and 4 are dynamic forgeries.
4.2 Experimental Protocol
Several enrolment strategies are considered in this paper
using genuine signatures from sessions 1 to 3, see Figure 5:
Scenario 1: using K=4 genuine signatures from the first
session (mono-session). This scenario models the situation
where users are enrolled in the system by providing 4 sig-
natures consecutively (i.e. in the same session). Scenario
2: using K=4 genuine signatures, but considering also sig-
natures from the second and third sessions (multi-session),
capturing more user variability. Scenario 3: increasing the
size of the enrolment set to K=12 signatures by taking all
signatures from sessions 1 to 3 (multi-session).
For each scenario, the four genuine signatures of ses-
sion 4 are used for testing. Real impostor test scores are
computed by using the 3 skilled forgeries of each session.
As a result, we have 133×4=532 genuine similarity scores
for each scenario, and four sets of 133×3=399 scores from
skilled forgeries for each scenario.
5 Results
Figure 6 shows the system performance based on the
level of skill in the forgeries for the three machine experts
used in this paper. We also report the results when fusing
the two off-line systems available using the TANH normal-
ization proposed in [11] and the SUM fusion rule.
Concerning the off-line systems, Figure 6 shows that a
significant degradation in the verification performance is
only observed for the maximum level of skill in the forg-
eries (level 4). For the other levels (1 to 3), there is no clear
degradation in the performance. On the contrary, the on-
line system exhibits a progressive degradation from level 1
to 4. These results suggest that the progressive level of skill
in the forgeries that are introduced from level 1 to 4 mainly
affects to the dynamic information of signatures, which are
analyzed solely by the on-line system. Off-line systems,
which analyze static information, are not as heavily affected
(only in level 4).
Regarding the three enrolment scenarios considered, we
observe that the performance is progressively improved
from scenario 1 (K=4 genuine signatures from one session)
to scenario 3 (K=12 signatures from three sessions). The
only exception is the global off-line system, which does
not show significant differences between scenario 1 and 2.
Worth noting, the on-line system is quite robust to the level
of skill in the forgeries in the scenario 3, resulting in similar
performance in levels 2 to 4.
It is also worth noting that the on-line system results in
the highest relative performance improvement in the multi-
session enrolment scenarios. Since it exploits the dynamic
information available in on-line signatures, it is more ben-
efited by the incorporation of user variability and/or addi-
tional signatures in the enrolment set. In this sense, we
also observe that the biggest improvement in the on-line
system is from the enrolment scenario 1 to 2 (i.e., mono-
vs multi-session training for the same number of enrolment
signatures), which is much higher than from scenario 2 to
3 (i.e., from 4 to 16 multi-session training signatures). This
result highlights the importance of an adequate enrolment
representative of the natural multi-session signer variability,
which can be obtained even with a reduced number of train-
ing signatures. The fusion of the two off-line systems also
increases the relative improvement figures when consider-
ing better enrolment scenarios with respect to the two sys-
tems alone. In this case, the improvement from enrolment
scenario 1 to 2 is similar to the one observed from scenario
2 to 3. This means that for different enrolment strategies in
off-line recognition the performance improvement mainly
comes from larger training sets, not from the multi-session
aspect in the enrolment data, which was crucial in the online
case.
6 Conclusions
The robustness of signature verification systems to forg-
eries with increasing level of skill has been studied. For this
purpose, a database containing forgeries with incremental
level of skill has been used. Three machine experts exploit-
ing information at different levels have been used in the ex-
periments: one off-line system based on local information
that uses contour level features, one off-line system based
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Figure 6. Verification performance based on the level of skill in the forgeries for the different scenar-
ios presented in Section 4.2. Results are given in terms of Equal Error Rates (in %). For each level of
skill, it is also given the relative gain of performance of the scenario 3 with respect to the scenario 1.
on global image analysis that computes slant directions of
the signature strokes and those of the envelopes of the di-
lated signature images, and one on-line system based on
HMM. Several enrolment strategies with different size and
variability of the enrolment set have been also compared.
Our experiments show that the performance of the off-
line systems is only degraded with the highest level of skill
in the forgeries. On the contrary, the on-line system exhibits
a progressive degradation with the level of skill, suggesting
that the dynamic information of signatures is the one more
affected by the considered increasing skills of the forgers.
Concerning the three enrolment scenarios proposed, it is
observed that the performance of the three machine experts
is improved as we increase the size and the variability of
the enrolment set. It is worthy to remark that the on-line
system becomes nearly insensitive to the level of skill in the
forgeries for the third scenario (i.e. the one which has the
maximum size and variability in the enrolment set). This
results stresses the importance of having enrolment models
generated with enough data, and acquired at different mo-
ments. The scarcity of available templates when a user is
enrolled in a system is precisely one of the problems of sig-
nature systems. As can be observed from our results, several
templates are needed and template signatures should be cap-
tured in different sessions in order to obtain a robust model
that can deal with the natural user intra-variability, but this
is not always possible due to application and user conve-
nience constraints. One solution to this problem could be
the generation of synthetic signatures from a user, in order
to obtain more signatures for enrolment [12]. This will be a
source of future work.
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